The analysis in this paper first considers the impact on world food prices of the changes in protection for staple foods during the 2008 world food price crisis-changes that were generally designed to partially insulate domestic markets from changes in international prices. We find that this insulation substantially increased world prices for key food crops such as rice, wheat, maize and oilseeds. The net effect was to reduce domestic prices in only a few developing countries, while domestic prices in many other countries were increased despite their attempts to insulate against the price rises. We estimate that the overall reduction in import protection or increase in export restraints in developing countries reduced the extent to which global poverty would otherwise have risen. However, the actual poverty-reducing impact of insulation is much less than its apparent impact, and there are now domestic policy instruments that almost certainly could reduce the impact of higher food prices on the poor more efficiently than variations in trade restrictions.
Food Price Spikes, Price Insulation and Poverty
Many countries have responded to price spikes such as those of mid-2008, early 2011 and mid-2012 by adjusting their agricultural trade barriers in an attempt to insulate their domestic markets from higher international food prices. Martin and Anderson (2012) show that such interventions exacerbate the initial increase in international prices, and that this policy response is completely ineffective when both exporting and importing country groups insulate to the same extent, even though it may appear to each individual country to have been successful. In reality, those two country groups are likely to intervene to different extents, so the impact of the initial exogenous increase in international prices plus the additional influence of altered trade restrictions may generate non-obvious redistributions between countries.
One possibility is that countries where the poor are most adversely affected by higher food prices stabilize their domestic prices more than countries where the poor are less vulnerable to food price shocks. In that case, most poor people might be protected from the adverse impacts of the initial shock to food prices. A related possibility is that, if countries where producers and consumers are better able to deal with such shocks transmit a larger portion of the increase in international food prices, the adverse global poverty impacts of the original shock will be less (Timmer 2010) .
A more pessimistic possibility is that many of the countries which insulate from shocks to international food prices are countries for which the impacts on domestic poverty of higher food prices are relatively minor, or even favorable. Rich countries, for example, are well-placed to absorb price shocks because of the small shares of food in the expenditures of their consumers, their producers' access to risk management tools such as futures and options markets, and their 2 relatively well-developed social safety nets. Even so, some high-income countries have used highly-insulating policy instruments such as variable import levies. Another example of this possibility is where large, poor, food-importing countries-for which insulation is more expensive because it turns their terms of trade against them-might insulate less than would a small but otherwise similar country, and hence may not avoid adverse poverty outcomes.
It is clear from these examples that alterations in trade restrictions could increase or reduce the global poverty impact of higher prices. Only by looking at data on the changes in agricultural distortions during periods of rapid increases in international prices, and estimating the impacts of consequent food price changes on poverty in different countries, is it possible to ascertain which of these possibilities is more likely.
Knowing whether poverty rises or falls in response to changes in trade restrictions is insufficient for sound policy formulation though. The most cost-effective policy instrument for dealing with the poverty impacts of price rises is likely to be a domestic one-such as a welltargeted social safety net-that deals directly with the problem of poverty vulnerability. If such a policy is infeasible, considerable work is likely to be needed to identify feasible policy options that are more effective than border trade measures. This paper begins by looking at data on the consumption patterns and income sources of low-income households in a sample of developing countries in order to assess which commodities are likely to be important in analyzing the poverty impacts of changes in commodity prices. We then turn to data on agricultural price distortions, and in particular on relative movements in domestic and international prices, to assess the extent to which countries insulated their domestic market from the initial changes in international food prices during 2006-08. With these data we use models to compare the actual changes in domestic prices with those 3 that would have occurred in the absence of price-insulating policies. These price scenarios are then used to assess the impacts of food price changes on poverty both with and in the absence of price-insulating policy behavior. They allow us to make a much broader assessment of the impacts of price-insulating behavior on poverty than has previously been available. The final section examines alternative policy measures at unilateral, regional and multilateral levels which-together with complementary domestic measures-might more efficiently reduce the impact of future price spikes on poverty.
What price changes are important for the poor?
The direct short-run impact of food price changes on the well-being of a particular household depends on the proportional change in the real price of a particular food times the household's net purchases of that food (Deaton 1989) . Since food typically makes up a large share of the spending of poor people, we would generally expect food price changes to have a large impact on the living costs of the poor. However, the vast majority of poor people are rural (threequarters, according to Ravallion, Chen and Sangraula, 2007) , and most poor people earn their living from agriculture. Hence food expenditure shares alone are insufficient for determining the impact of food price changes on poverty: account also needs to be taken of the shares of household income obtained from the sale of food, and hence the net expenditures on food by the household.
The first two columns of Table 1 
Price insulation for key food commodities
The first step in our analysis is to consider the changes in prices of each of these four key food items in each of the sample countries for which we have information on income sources and expenditure patterns. For this, we follow Anderson and Nelgen (2012a, b) differences between the types of rice traded; and freight costs that make the export prices that are quoted internationally more volatile than most border prices.
Changes in domestic prices of rice were more subdued than changes in the border prices.
This is also shown in Figure 1 . The median price rise was only 44 percent, with half of the price increases in the 30 to 64 percent range. Because domestic prices generally rose less than international prices, we also observe a reduction in protection, 2 with a median change of -18 percent (measured as the change in (1+t), where t is the rate of the trade tax equivalent). Most countries' protection rates fell between 0 and 30 percent.
2 Protection is defined as the ratio of the domestic price to the border price of a like product. If there are no other price-distorting policies than border measures, as assumed here, this is both the farmers' nominal assistance coefficient and an indicator of the distortion to the domestic consumer price. For some countries this indicator may be negative, usually because it is an exporting country with an export restriction, although in rare cases it indicates import subsidization.
9 Corresponding to these differences in domestic and international price changes we observe a 
Edible oils
Oilseeds and edible oils are much more complex to monitor than cereals because of the diverse set of commodities involved. To obtain at least a broad guide on developments in this market, we examine three key oil products-palm oil, palm kernel oil, and soybean oil-to obtain the average changes in international prices shown in Table 6 . In order to measure the changes in domestic and border prices for edible oils, we consider a consumption-weighted price index for palm oil and major oil seeds (soybeans, cottonseed, soybeans, and groundnuts). We report a distribution of so-defined border prices in Figure 4 and find that the median border price change was 85 percent and that the majority of border price changes were between 55 and 110 percent. protection to key crop products are detailed in Table 7 . The table also includes at the bottom, for comparison, five large developing countries for which suitable household data are unavailable.
The table reveals that protection in most developing countries fell during the observed period.
The few cases where there are increases in protection are mostly African countries, and are likely to have been caused by these countries' food markets being detached from international markets. Note also from Table 7 that changes in protection among the five large developing countries for which we do not have household data are broadly similar to the changes in protection in our sample countries, apart from China, where protection fell only for rice, and Egypt and Russia, where protection increased for wheat and oils. 
Results
In this section we first compute the impact of changes in trade restrictions around the world on international prices of our four key food items. We then examine how much domestic prices changed relative to (a) actual international price changes during 2006-08 and (b) what the latter would have been had all countries abstained from insulating. This is followed by an analysis of the impact of changes in trade restrictions by different groups of countries on prices in other countries, exposing the extent to which some large insulating countries shift the burden of adjustment to others. Attention then turns to estimating the impacts of insulation on poverty in our sample countries and, by extrapolation, in the world as a whole.
Impacts of changing trade restrictions on international prices
To obtain an indication of the impact of the observed protection changes on domestic prices, we need first to estimate the impact of those changes in trade restrictions on international prices.
That involves taking account of the changes in protection in countries that collectively account for a very large share of world production/consumption. Following Martin and Anderson (2012), we do this using the simplest possible model-a model which assumes (a) that each product is homogeneous, (b) that we can focus on just consumption because of limited supply response opportunities, and (c) that demand elasticities for each product are equal across countries. As a cross-check, we repeat the estimation assuming the supply response elasticity is unity (and the demand elasticity is -0.2).
For small changes in protection policy, we can, as shown in Martin and Anderson (2012) express the relationship between change in the power of protective tariffs or export taxes/subsidies, and percentage changes in the world price as:
15 where is the share of country i's output in global production at world prices, is its share of global consumption, is the supply elasticity and is the demand elasticity. For potentially large changes in world prices and in protection, it is helpful to work in log changes, which are equal in magnitude (but opposite in sign) for a protection increase and protection cut that reverses the initial increase. This yields an equation for the change in the log of the world prices as a function of changes in countries' rates of protection:
Once we know the change in the world price resulting from any change in countries' protection policies, and the change in policies in country i, we can estimate the impact on prices in country i as:
We are particularly interested in the percentage change in the domestic price in each country when all countries refrain from insulation. This is obtained by estimating the change in the world price resulting from all countries reversing their insulating policies, plus the change in country i's own interventions from reversing the observed change in its own protection. If we set the initial price level at unity, the usual proportional change in p from its initial level can be recovered by recalling that, from an initial price level of unity, Δln p=ln(1+ .
Estimates of the impacts of price-insulating behavior on international prices are reported in the first two columns of Using the simple consumption-only model, the increases in world prices are given by minus the weighted average of changes in countries' rates of protection, obtained using as weights the values of consumption at international prices. If, for instance, all countries reduce the power of the protection rate (1+t) applying in their market by 10 percent, the world price will rise by 10 percent. This measure allows for a very simple interpretation: a country that changes its protection by less than the weighted average change in trade taxation will experience a change in domestic prices that is larger than it would have experienced absent insulation by all countries.
The extent of the contribution by each country to the changes in international rice and wheat prices can be seen by the size of each country's shaded rectangle in Figure 5 . In this diagram, the countries whose protection (measured by 1+t) fell by more than the increase in world prices were effective in sheltering themselves from part of the increase in world prices.
Those countries where protection fell by less than the increase in international prices experienced an increase in domestic prices greater than would have occurred in the absence of insulation.
Countries whose protection rate did not change experienced the full proportional increase in world prices-an increase that results from both the original shock and the compounding effect of price insulation. In the two unusual case where a country apparently increases its protection during a price spike (as with maize in Ethiopia and Tanzania), the outcome is probably due to isolation rather than insulation, with domestic prices being determined by local supply and demand and rising because of short domestic supplies that just happened to coincide with a period of high international prices.
For rice, it appears that China, India and the Philippines reduced their protection enough to have smaller domestic price increases than they would have experienced without insulation by any country. China and India contributed much more to the overall increase in world prices than did the Philippines because of their much greater share in world markets-because of both their size and the extent to which they each insulated against the increase in world prices. Other countries, such as Indonesia and Bangladesh insulated themselves to some degree from the increase in world prices-and hence increased the magnitude of the rise in world prices-but not by enough to offset the price-increasing implications of all countries' collective action. For these countries, the domestic price increased more than it would have done in the absence of all countries' insulation.
For wheat, the countries that insulated sufficiently that their domestic price rose by less than it would have in the absence of insulation include China, Pakistan, Japan and Iran. While India insulated, it appears not to have done so enough to reduce the increase in domestic prices below the increase that would have occurred in the absence of insulation. For other countries, it appears that the increase in domestic prices was greater than it would have been in the absence of insulation.
For maize, China, the Republic of Korea and Indonesia insulated enough to reduce the rise in their domestic prices relative to the no-insulation scenario, while for edible oils it is China 18 and Japan that insulated enough to reduce the volatility of their domestic prices. For other countries, price volatility was greater than it would have been in the absence of intervention. Other countries
Domestic prices with and without insulation
We can now estimate the change in domestic prices that would have occurred in each country had it and all other countries not altered the restriction on their international trade in these key food items. These domestic price changes, reported in Table 9 , therefore take into account two separate price impacts: first, the impact of not changing protection, which typically means removing a reduction in protection and hence increases domestic prices relative to the world prices; and second, the abstention from insulation by the whole world, which lowers international prices. Hence a country which would double its protection (that is, doubling its domestic price relative to the international price) could experience zero domestic price impact if at the same time international prices halved.
In practice, the price impacts across different countries and commodities vary considerably, depending on the actual level of insulation and its relative size compared to the hypothetical change in the international price. For example, the price of rice would rise in China in the absence of insulation because undoing its 37.4-percent reduction in protection would raise its domestic prices by 59.6 percent and even though the world prices would at the same time fall by 35.1 percent with the removal of protection, the overall impact on domestic price of rice in China would be a net increase of 3.7 percent. On the other hand, the price of rice would fall in Tanzania where protection rose slightly between 2006 and 2008 and therefore in the absence of any protection in the world Tanzania would experience a reduction in domestic prices equal to the reduction in the world price of rice (35.1 percent) amplified by the reduction in its own protection which would lower domestic price of rice by additional 3.7 percent for a total reduction by 37.4 percent. 
Distribution of price changes due to different country groups' actions
With different countries applying different changes in protection during 2006-2008, only some countries achieved the desired degree of insulation of domestic prices while others experienced higher prices than they would if no country had insulated. In other words, the countries that insulated the most vigorously -exported‖ price increases to the countries that insulated less.
Because these -imports‖ and -exports‖ of price increases have important consequences for 21 poverty, it is important to understand how different groups of countries, and especially the poorest ones, handled their own insulation and whether their decisions contributed to or reduced global poverty.
To facilitate such an analysis, Figure 6 shows the distribution of price changes due to countries' actions from two perspectives: developed versus developing countries (densely shaded boxes), and within each of those country groups(lightly shaded).
Consider first the impacts of the actions of developed and developing countries acting as two aggregate groups. The densely shaded set of bars in each subfigure shows the magnitude of the price change transmitted between developed and developing countries. That magnitude is determined by the consumption share of each group (the x-axis) and the size of excess insulation (over the international price change). As can be seen, in each case the actions of the developing countries lower the extent of their own price rise at the expense of the developed countries. Only in the case of rice did the impact of the developing countries' actions not lower their own price rise much. This is because rice consumption in developed countries is a tiny share of world consumption and hence little of the rice price increase could be -exported‖ from those countries.
Second, consider the level of coordination among developing countries' own actions, by focusing on the lightly shaded bars which show how much of the international price change was distributed within the group by group member actions. In the case of rice, for example, India and China insulated their markets much more than other developing countries, shifting large price increases onto the shoulders of other developing countries. A similar situation can be observed for the remaining crops, where China alone was successful in lowering the extent of its own domestic price rise but, in doing so, put upward pressure on prices in other countries.
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Figure 6: The distribution of price changes due to the observed insulation between developed and developing countries (densely shaded) and among major developing and developed countries (lightly shaded boxes)
Source: Authors' calculations
Poverty impacts
Using our sample of 30 developing countries, we can now evaluate the poverty impacts of the hypothetical price changes associated with removing the observed levels of price insulation in the period 2006-08. To calculate poverty impacts, we follow the methodology of Ivanic, Martin, Zaman (2012) who measure changes in poverty as a change in the number of people living on less than US$1.25 a day. Following their approach, we also only consider the short-run impact of the changes in food prices on households' agricultural sales and food expenditures. That is, we ignore any quantity adjustments (increases in production or changes in consumption), and we also ignore any impacts of food price changes on wage rates. We compare the base simulation, in which we consider the actual observed levels of insulation, with another simulation in which we assume that all developing countries insulated by the same degree, namely that equal to the average observed developing-country insulation. This counterfactual simulation allows us to see whether the decisions of individual countries helped the poor or made the situation worse for them. Both sets of results are shown in Table 10 in   24 terms of percentage point changes in the initial poverty rates as well as the estimated absolute changes in poverty. Based on the coverage of our sample of global poverty by region and income level, we assign weights to the individual countries included in our sample and extrapolate sample poverty changes into poverty estimates at the global, regional (WB regions) and income-group level (low, lower middle and upper middle income countries) . To perform this extrapolation, we assign weights to the countries in the sample to make them represent all missing countries for the particular income and region group. With the inclusion of China and India, our sample covers extensively most of the regions and income groups with poverty and especially the -pockets of poverty‖ among lower-middle income countries of South Asia (SAR), upper middle-income countries of East Asia (EAP) where our sample coverage is nearly perfect as documented by Table 11 . The assigned weights for individual countries and the characteristics of the missing countries also allow us to evaluate the relationship between the sample statistics and population statistics.
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In order to understand how the statistical properties of our sample relate to the population (developing countries') statistics, we perform a Monte Carlo simulation of 10,000 runs in which we simulate normally distributed poverty changes in a set of 109 developing countries with weights equal to their poor population shares. In each run, we calculate weighted mean poverty changes for the whole population and a sample of 30 countries representing our sample, and the difference between the two. Finally, we calculate the ratio of the variance of differences between the sample and population means, and the mean variance of the sample, which we find to be equal to 1.47%. This ratio means that the mean that we obtain from our sample estimates the population mean with standard deviation equal to 12.1 percent of the sample standard deviation.
The poverty results suggest that the observed level of price insulation helped lower global poverty. Had developing countries abstained from it, global poverty would have been higher by about 57.5 million extra people who would have fallen into poverty as a result. The standard deviation of this estimate is 18.6 million, which means that the estimate is positive with significance level less than 0.5 percent.
Had all developing countries insulated identically at the average level, even that uniform insulation would have saved an extra 8.8 million people falling below the $1.25 a day poverty line. Even though this estimate is not significant from zero (significance level more than 10 percent), it suggests that the insulation by developing countries probably help prevent an increase in poverty. Based on these results we may conclude that the differential actions of individual developing countries were the key factor for alleviating the poverty impact through insulation.
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Two other useful measures are presented in Table 13 and Table 14 . They are partial indicators, not taking into account the effects of insulation on international prices. The first is the impact of observed changes in domestic prices on poverty. This measure suggests that the increases in the prices of our four products would, using the approaches of this paper, result in an increase of 75.8 million people living below the $1.25 per day poverty line. The second measure, which we term the apparent poverty reduction from price insulation, is the effect of altering trade restrictions on poverty assuming that the international price is unchanged by countries'
interventions. This measure is 146.3 million people estimate with significance level less than 0.1percent. It seems likely that policy makers-particularly in small countries-would focus on this measure because it does not require a model of policy choice in a world of many countries, and does not require knowledge of the policy responses taken by other countries. Unfortunately, as is clear from Table 14 , it is a very upward-biased estimate of the effectiveness of price insulation: the numbers in are much closer to the true situation.
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Some Policy Implications
Standard principles of economic policy suggest that the most effective approach in dealing with the poverty consequences of price volatility is via instruments targeted most directly at the problem. This suggests a social safety net aimed directly at alleviating poverty is likely to be better than an indirect policy that operates through market prices facing all consumers, and even more so than one at a country's border since that also affects producer incentives. If, however, pure safety net policies are not feasible to the extent required, it may be necessary to consider alternative policies.
As has recently been shown by Gouel and Jean (2012) , policy makers in small countries where high food prices have adverse welfare impacts have an incentive to use trade policies that insulate their domestic markets from large changes in international prices. At the global level, such insulating policies are beggar-thy-neighbor because measures-such as export restrictions-that lower domestic prices in a group of collectively-large countries raise international prices. However, Gouel and Jean (2012) find that targeted subsidies to domestic storage combined with trade policies yield better outcomes for each individual country than either policy alone-and would clearly be better for the world as a whole than insulating trade policies alone.
The apparent success of some countries in reducing the extent of increase in domestic prices might lead one to encourage or assist other developing countries to achieve the same high degree of price insulation. This would, however, run head-first into the collective action At the regional level, there may be scope for policy commitments that reduce the adverse impacts of beggar-thy-neighbor policies. If, for instance, regional groups were able to make binding commitments to allow exports to flow even during times of shortage, then this may reduce the deep-seated concerns of policy makers in importing countries about the availability of sufficient importable food in times of crisis.
It is understandable that countries depending heavily on the international food market worry that they might be vulnerable to export controls or taxes imposed by their suppliers. At the WTO, many importing countries have put forward proposals for disciplining export barriers (Congo 2001 , Japan 2000 , Jordan 2001 , Korea 2001 , Switzerland 2000 . Some of these proposals are far reaching. For example, the Jordan proposal is to ban export restrictions and bind all export taxes at zero. The proposal by Japan involves disciplines similar to those on the import side, with export restrictions to be replaced by taxes and export taxes to be bound. Recognizing The ability of importing countries to lower protection when prices rise is currently unconstrained by WTO rules, except that countries with low initial tariffs have little scope to reduce their protection when world prices rise. They can, though, introduce import subsidies, and indeed some countries did in 2008. If exporting countries were to be restrained by WTO rules from introducing export barriers, however, there would be less need to be concerned about the effects of tariff reductions on international prices.
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Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed the distributional and poverty impacts of the food price insulation that was observed in the period of 2006-2008 when prices of many staple food items increased sharply. For four major food items-rice, wheat, maize and edible oils-which comprise nearly half of poor people's food expenditure, we have estimated how much the observed insulating actions of developing countries, taken as a whole and individually, affected international and domestic food prices and how much it alleviated an increase in global poverty.
As in other recent studies, we find that the observed patterns of price insulation resulted in a rise of international prices which partly offset the benefits of insulation. We also find, however, that developing countries as a group insulated more than developed countries and, as a result, parts of the price increases were -exported‖ to developed countries. This pattern of insulation applies to all four commodities considered in this study, but least so in the case of rice because developed countries represent only a tiny portion of global rice consumption. We find too that were all developing countries to have acted identically such that their insulation was the same as the aggregate actually observed, that alone would have prevented an estimated 32.5 million extra people falling into poverty.
In addition to the observed insulating responses by developing countries resulting in -exportation‖ of higher prices to the developed countries, a lot of the transfers of higher prices also happened among developing countries themselves. In particular, large countries, especially China and India, insulated much more than the rest of the developing world, which meant the domestic prices of such heavily insulating countries rose less at the expense of greater price rises other developing countries. Nonetheless, this was good from the viewpoint of global poverty 32 alleviation: it prevented an extra 57.5 million people from falling into poverty. Even so, it led to higher poverty in some smaller low-income developing countries.
One further result worth emphasizing is that the effectiveness of price insulation in reducing poverty is much lower than it might appear on the surface. While the apparent poverty reduction associated with price insulation in 2006-08 is estimated to be 146.3 million if one ignores the impact of insulation on international prices, the estimated effect when the latter impact is included is about half that number, at 75.8 million for the set of commodities considered in this paper.
A number of caveats to this analysis need to be kept in mind, however. First, we have examined the price effects for just four food items. Including all food items is unlikely to alter the main conclusions though because the four included items are very dominant except in small low-income countries not well integrated into global food markets.
Second, we have not taken account of any indirect effects on poor households that come via factor markets. In agrarian economies with the vast majority of workers employed in agriculture, an increase in farm product prices may raise unskilled wages. That would lower the adverse impact on landless laborers of higher food prices, although we have not found this channel of effect to change the results substantially in earlier work in this vein (Ivanic and Martin 2008; Ivanic, Martin and Zaman 2012) .
Third, our results are based on a sample of developing countries which excludes China, the largest developing country, because of the lack of access to household data for China. If the poor households in China and other excluded countries are very different from those in our sample in terms of their food consumption and production patterns, their inclusion in the future could affect the results.
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One important final point is that, notwithstanding the apparent benefits of insulation in terms of poverty avoidance in this case, trade measures are very unlikely to be the most efficient instruments for achieving this outcome. Poverty concerns are generally best dealt with using generic social safety net measures that can offset the adverse impacts of a wide range of different shocks on poor people-net sellers as well as net buyers of food-without imposing the costly by-product distortions that necessarily accompany the use of n th -best trade policy instruments for social protection. They could take the form of targeted income supplements to only the most vulnerable households, and only while the price spike lasts. This is a far more feasible approach now than just a few years ago, thanks to the digital information and communication technology (ICT) revolution. In the past it has often been claimed that such payments are unaffordable in poor countries because of the fiscal outlay involved and the high cost of administering such handouts. However, recall that in roughly half the cases considered above, governments reduce their trade tax rates, so even that intervention may require a drain on the budget of many finance ministries-as does replacing a non-prohibitive export tax with a ban. In any case, the option of using value-added taxes in place of trade taxes to raise government revenue has become common practice in even low-income countries over the past decade or two. Moreover, the ICT revolution has made it possible for conditional cash transfers to be provided electronically as direct assistance to even remote and small households, and even to the most vulnerable members of those households (typically women and their young children). If those targeted have a greater propensity to spend on food than those being taxed to fund the transfers, Do, Levchenko and Ravallion (2012) point out that they would boost the global demand for food and hence there would still be a beggar-thy-neighbor impact on international prices. Almost certainly, however, 34 that would be smaller than the impact generated by the much blunter approach of altering trade restrictions.
